Decision-Making & Behavioral

NASA Challenger

NASA · Aerospace / government · 1986 Intermediate

Featuring Roger Boisjoly, Diane Vaughan

The night before Challenger launched on January 28, 1986, engineers at Morton Thiokol begged NASA to delay. Forecast temperatures were colder than any prior launch, and the O-rings that sealed the rocket booster joints had a documented sensitivity to cold. Every previous flight that survived erosion had quietly become evidence that the risk was acceptable. The engineers were overruled. Seventy-three seconds after liftoff, the shuttle broke apart.

This case matters because the same pattern shows up in boardrooms, not just launch control. It sharpens the decision every operator eventually faces: what to do when the person closest to the danger raises an inconvenient objection and the room wants to move forward. The Rogers Commission found the warning signals had been present for years. How an organization filters out its own best information, and what it takes to keep that from happening to you, is the question the app leaves in your hands.

Topics
  • NASA
  • Challenger
  • groupthink
  • normalization of deviance
  • Roger Boisjoly
  • Morton Thiokol
  • decision-making
  • risk management
  • Diane Vaughan
  • organizational culture

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